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CHANGE IN THE AVAILABILITY OF FEDERAL 
HABEAS CORPUS: ITS SIGNIFICANCE 
FOR STATE PRISONERS AND STATE 
CORRECTIONAL PROGRAMSt 
Frank J. Remington* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Expressions of dissatisfaction with state prisoner use of federal 
writs of habeas corpus continue. Recently Attorney General Meese 
was reported as telling the Judicial Conference of the Seventh Circuit: 
"[M]ost of the writs filed today were frivolous 'recreational activities' 
[by inmates whom he referred to as 'lawyers in penitentiaries'] 
designed to harass federal authorities."1 Referring to the Reagan ad-
ministration's proposal pending in the United States Senate to restrict 
habeas corpus, Mr. Meese said the bill "would preserve the great writ 
for appropriate cases."2 
Repeated, but as yet unsuccessful, efforts have been made in the 
Congress to narrow the scope of federal habeas corpus review of state 
court criminal convictions. 3 The circumstances in which habeas 
t I am mindful of the fact that this issue of the Michigan Law Review honors Frank Allen on 
the occasion of his retirement from Michigan. I have known Frank as a friend and as one of the 
truly thoughtful people in the criminal law field. The thesis of this article is that federal courts 
ought, in state habeas corpus cases, be concerned about guilt or innocence and relative degrees of 
guilt, a position which I think Frank Allen would support, though I have not discussed this with 
him. From his early work on poverty and the administration of federal criminal justice (REPORT 
OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE ON POVERTY AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF 
FEDERAL CRIMINAL JurncE (1963)) to his more recent writings, Frank Allen has focused his 
attention on the individual defendant. He has effectively argued against overly long 
incarceration to achieve unrealistic rehabilitative goals, and against the overly long incarceration 
that results from some present-day efforts to avoid disparities in punishment which "tend to 
punish people the same way who have committed crimes in very different circumstances." Allen, 
The Decline of the Rehabilitative Ideal in American Criminal Justice, 27 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 147, 
155 (1978). 
* Jackson Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin. - Ed. I was assisted in the prepara-
tion of this article by Michael Bauer, Lucille Hamre, and Diane Roessler. 
1. Milwaukee Sentinel, May 20, 1986, at 5, col. 1. 
2. Id. The Attorney General's reference was to a bill introduced by Senator Thurmond, S. 
2301, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986). 
3. The congressional history is documented in Olsen, Judicial Proposals to Limit the Jurlsdic· 
tional Scope of Federal Post-Conviction Habeas Corpus Consideration of the Claims of State Pris· 
oners, 31 BUFFALO L. REV. 301, 334 nn.178-79 (1982); see also L. YACKLE, POSTCONVICTION 
REMEDIES§ 19, at 92 nn.40-41 (1981); id. § 19, at 26-27 (Supp. 1986); Remington, State Prisoner 
Access to Postconviction Relief-A Lessening Role for Federal Courts: An Increasingly Important 
Role for State Courts, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 287, 292-96 (1983); Yackle, The Reagan Administration's 
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corpus is available to state prisoners have also been the subject of an 
increasing number of decisions of the United States Supreme Court, 
and, over the past several decades, the subject of voluminous law re-
view literature.4 
Put most succinctly, dissatisfaction with broad access to habeas 
corpus by state prisoners has been expressed for the following rea-
sons. 5 First, the present situation is inconsistent with a proper alloca-
tion of responsibility between federal and state courts. The abuse of 
the writ by state prisoners has resulted in an undue burden on the 
federal judiciary. 6 Even when petitions have arguable merit, it is an 
affront to state courts, particularly state supreme courts, to be over-
ruled by a single United States district court judge. 
Second, the current situation is inconsistent with an effective state 
criminal justice system. The use, and particularly the abuse, of the 
writ has resulted in the lack of finality of state court convictions so 
that the deterrent effect of a conviction is lessened and the prisoner 
remains more interested in litigation than in rehabilitation.7 
The proposals for change have been several, reflecting some differ-
ences of opinion whether the principal issue is a wise allocation of 
responsibility between federal and state courts, the achievement of a 
more effective criminal justice response to crime, or the adherence to 
certain fundamental values including, but not limited to, protection of 
the innocent. The proposals for change that have been suggested 
include: 
Habeas Corpus Proposals, 68 IOWA L. REV. 609 (1983); Note, Proposed Modification of Federal 
Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners - Reform or Revocation?, 61 GEO. L.J. 1221 (1973). 
4. See, e.g., Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 
76 HARV. L. REv. 441 (1963); Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal 
Judgments, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 142 (1970). More contemporary articles discussing the availabil-
ity of habeas corpus to state prisoners are: Haddad, The Finality Distinction in Supreme Court 
Retroactivity Analysis: An Inadequate Su"ogate for Modification of the Scope of Federal Habeas 
Corpus, 79 Nw. U. L. REV. 1062 (1984-1985); Meltzer, State Court Forfeitures of Federal Rights, 
99 HARV. L. REv. 1130 (1986); Pagano, Federal Habeas Corpus far State Prisoners: Present and 
Future, 49 ALB. L. REv. 1 (1984); Note, Emerging Jurisdictional Doctrines of the Burger Court: 
A Doctrine of Convenience, 59 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 316 (1985). 
5. See 3 W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE§ 27.2, at 301-06 (1984), for a 
summary of Justice Powell's analysis of the unnecessary cost of overly expansive federal habeas 
review. 
6. The number of state habeas cases increased from 8349 in 1984 to 8534 in 1985, with the 
most cases filed in Florida and Texas. See ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMIN-
ISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES CoURTS 148 (1985), contained in REPORTS OF THE 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES (1985). 
7. It is usually unclear whether the concern is with a lessening of the deterrent effect of the 
criminal sanction, which arguably can be achieved even if the inmate who appears guilty is in 
fact innocent, or with rehabilitation, which hardly seems achievable by "finality" if in fact the 
inmate did not commit the crime of which he or she has been convicted. Justice Powell's recital 
of the detrimental effect of the lack of finality probably is directed to the availability of habeas 
corpus in cases with no colorable showing of innocence. 
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(1) One should not have a right to habeas corpus review if a full 
and fair hearing has been held in state court. 8 
(2) One should not have a right to habeas corpus review unless 
all state procedures have been exhausted.9 When an issue has not been 
raised in state court, federal habeas review should be available only if 
there was "cause" for the failure to raise the issue in state court and 
"prejudice" resulting to the petitioner as a result of the inability to 
raise the issue. 10 In addition, for those issues decided in state court, 
the factual conclusions by the state court must be presumed to be 
correct. 11 
(3) Federal court review should be limited to issues that relate to 
the reliability of the state court guilt-finding process. 12 
(4) Federal court review should be limited to petitioners who can 
make a colorable showing that they are in fact innocent of the crime 
for which they have been convicted.13 
(5) Federal court review should be limited to constitutional viola-
tions that amount to "fundamental unfairness."14 
(6) Federal court review should be limited to issues raised within 
a specified period of time following the exhaustion of state court 
remedies. 15 
Before discussing these proposals in greater detail it may be helpful 
to review the current availability of federal habeas corpus to state pris-
oners, particularly in light of the several cases decided during last 
year's Term of the United States Supreme Court. 
8. The classical development of this is found in Bator, supra note 4; see also 3 W. LAFAVE & 
J. ISRAEL, supra note 5, § 27.3, at 324-27. 
9. See 3 W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 5, § 27.7, at 373-81. 
10. See id. § 27.4, at 337-53. 
11. See id. § 27.6, at 361-73. 
12. See L. YACKLE, supra note 3, at 395-400. 
13. Id. at 398. Yackle points out that a colorable showing of innocence may resemble the 
more familiar inquiry into harmless error. 
14. This is the position of Justice Stevens, who clearly would go beyond issues of guilt or 
innocence but would not make habeas available for all, even nonharmless, constitutional viola· 
tions. His view is that constitutional violations are of three types: harmless, those raisable only on 
appeal, and those raisable by means of habeas. See, e.g., Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 543-44 
(1982) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 95-97 (1977) (Stevens, J., 
concurring). 
IS. See S. 2301, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 6 (1986); see also H.R. 73, lOOth Cong., 1st Sess. 
§ 2(e) (1987); H.R. 72, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(e) (1987); S. 260, IOOth Cong., 1st Sess. (1987). 
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II. FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS REVIEW OF STATE COURT 
CONVICTIONS: RECENT CHANGES BY THE UNITED 
STATES SUPREME COURT 
573 
The current situation at the end of the most recent Term of the 
United States Supreme Court is as follows: 
(1) State remedies must be exhausted before filing a petition of 
habeas corpus in federal court. The failure to raise an issue in state 
court because of a procedural default precludes federal habeas corpus 
relief unless there are both "cause" for the failure to raise the issue in 
state court and "prejudice" resulting to the petitioner as a conse-
quence of not being able to raise the issue. Absent either "cause" or 
"prejudice," the petitioner may raise the issue only if he or she can 
demonstrate that the "constitutional violation has probably resulted in 
the conviction of one who is actually innocent."16 In this latter in-
stance "a federal habeas court may grant the writ even in the absence 
of a showing of cause for the procedural default."17 
(2) A fourth amendment claim cannot be raised by means of fed-
eral habeas unless there was not a full and fair hearing in state court, 18 
or if the failure to raise the issue in state court constitutes a denial of 
the sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel.19 Even if 
counsel is ineffective (and thus there is a showing of "cause" for failing 
to raise the issue in state court), three members of the Court expressly 
reserved judgment on whether the "prejudice" requirement is fulfilled 
if the petitioner clearly is guilty of the crime of which he or she was 
convicted. 
(3) With respect to non-fourth amendment claims (in a case in 
which the issue was raised and decided in state court and state reme-
dies have been exhausted), the Court is split. 
Led by Justice Powell, some members of the Court focus on the 
guilt/innocence issue both to determine when habeas is appropriate 
(Does the alleged error affect the reliability of the fact-finding pro-
cess?),20 and to determine whether the error was harmless (Is guilt 
shown beyond a reasonable doubt?).21 In contrast, Justice Stevens 
would allow habeas in situations not involving the reliability of the 
fact-finding process and would refuse, in appropriate circumstances, to 
16. Murray v. Carrier, 106 S. Ct. 2639, 2650 (1986). 
17. 106 S. Ct. at 2650. 
18. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 481-82 (1976). 
19. Kemmelman v. Morrison, 106 S. Ct. 2574 (1986). 
20. Rose v. Clark, 106 S. Ct. 3101 (1986). 
21. 106 S. Ct. at 3107. 
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find harmless error even when guilt is shown beyond a reasonable 
doubt.22 
What Professor Seidman said in 1980 remains true today: 
On close examination, the Burger Court's criminal procedure decisions 
are not consistent with a guilt-or-innocence model of criminal justice. 
On the contrary, the Court has continued to use the criminal justice sys-
tem as a tool for social engineering, even when this pursuit of broad 
social goals conflicts with the need to reach factually reliable judgments 
in individual cases. 23 
Both Justice Powell and Justice Stevens, and those members of the 
Court who joined them in individual cases, have agreed that the avail-
ability of federal habeas to state prisoners should be restricted some-
what. Neither Justice Powell nor Justice Stevens recognizes habeas as 
proper merely because of a violation offederal constitutional law. The 
difference of opinion relates to the proper basis for limiting habeas. 
Justice Powell would require a showing of a constitutional error affect-
ing the reliability of the guilt-finding process and a colorable showing 
of innocence by the individual petitioner (at least that guilt not be 
shown beyond a reasonable doubt and thus the error be found harm-
less). So-called social engineering changes such as those affecting the 
racial composition of the grand jury would, if Justice Powell had his 
way, be left to the Supreme Court on direct review. Justice Stevens, 
on the other hand, would allow habeas for any constitutional violation 
that results in fundamental unfairness, whether or not the violation 
related to the reliability of the guilt-finding process and whether or not 
there is a colorable showing of innocence by the individual petitioner. 
Whether either view will emerge as the clear majority view, only 
the future will tell. The Court's effort to develop a basis for limiting 
state prisoner access to federal habeas is the background against which 
to compare the proposed congressional limitation upon access to fed-
eral habeas. 
22. 106 S. Ct. 3101, 3111-12 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
23. Seidman, Factual Guilt and the Burger Court: An Examination of Continuity and Change 
in Criminal Procedure, SO CoLUM. L. REV. 436, 437 (1980). 
A recent, at least implicit, recognition of the propriety of using federal habeas to achieve non· 
guilt-or-innocence objectives is Allen v. Hardy, 106 S. Ct. 2878 (1986), in which the Court al· 
lowed habeas to be brought but declined to apply Batson v. Kentucky, 106 S. Ct. 1712 (1986) 
(changing the standard for proving unconstitutional racial abuse of peremptory challenges), 
retoactively because: 
By serving a criminal defendant's interest in neutral jury selection procedures, the rule in 
Batson may have some bearing on the truthfinding function of a criminal trial. But the 
decision serves other values as well. ... Accordingly, we cannot say that the new rule has 
such a fundamental impact on the integrity of factfinding as to compel retroactive 
application. 
106 S. Ct. at 2880-81. 
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III. CONGRESSIONAL PROPOSALS TO LIMIT THE AVAILABILITY 
OF FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS REVIEW 
Repeated efforts in Congress to limit access to federal courts by 
state prisoners have been unsuccessful, but the efforts continue, as re-
flected in S. 2301 introduced in the Senate in April 1986 by Senator 
Strom Thurmond. A somewhat similar bill was passed in February 
1984 by a Senate vote of 67 to 9,24 so clearly there was, at that time at 
least, substantial support for change in the current availability of fed-
eral habeas for state prisoners. The reintroduction of the bill in 1986 
indicates that at least some members of the Congress, the Reagan ad-
ministration, and others25 feel that the limitations adopted by the Bur-
ger Court still leave too much room for federal habeas corpus review 
of state court criminal convictions. 
Two major changes are proposed by the bill: First, a habeas peti-
tion must be filed within one year of the date when state remedies are 
exhausted. Second, any claim of federal constitutional violation can 
be brought only if there is a showing that the claim has not been "fully 
and fairly adjudicated" in state court. 26 
The language of S. 2301 would lead one to conclude that the limi-
tation of Stone v. Powell27 will be extended to all claims of denial of a 
federal constitutional right made in behalf of a state prisoner. Both 
Stone and S. 2301 use the language of full and fair adjudication in state 
court to describe claims that can no longer be raised by federal habeas 
corpus. 
Representatives of the Department of Justice do assert that the 
limitation is less strict than that imposed by Stone v. Powell on fourth 
amendment claims. A representative of the department asserted, in an 
answer to a question asked by Senator Biden: "This question mistak-
24. S. 1763, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984). 
25. Habeas Corpus Reform Act of 1982: Hearings on S. 2216 Before the Senate Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 223-30 (1982) (statement of a panel consisting of Hon. C.C. 
Torbert, Jr., Chief Justice, Supreme Court of Alabama; Hon. W. Ward Reynoldson, Chief Jus-
tice, Supreme Court of Iowa; and Hon. Jim Smith, Attorney General, State of Florida); see also 
letter to Hon. Strom Thurmond from Edward F. Hennessey, President, Conference of Chief 
Justices (Mar. 19, 1986) (copy on file at National Center for State Courts). 
26. S. 2301, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. § 5 (1986), would overrule Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 
(1982), and allow the federal court to dismiss meritless claims by state prisoners even though 
state remedies as to the dismissed claim have not been exhausted. Presumably the court could 
then consider those remaining claims as to which state remedies have been exhausted properly. 
The requirement of Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539 (1981), that factual conclusions by state courts 
be presumed correct, and the "cause" and "prejudice" requirements of Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 
U.S. 72 (1977), would apparently be continued. Slight change in language produces some uncer-
tainty whether Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), would continue to preclude federal court 
review of fourth amendment claims if the petition alleges that the state court's application of the 
fourth amendment in the particular case was "unreasonable." 
27. 428 U.S. 465 (1976). 
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enly assumes that the general standard of review under [S. 2301] is the 
same as that of Stone v. Powell In fact, it is broader, including a re-
view of the reasonableness of the state determination. "28 
The limiting language in Stone v. Powell is that habeas corpus is 
precluded if the state court afforded the defendant "an opportunity for 
full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim."29 S. 2301 pro-
vides that habeas corpus is precluded if the defendant's claim "has 
been fully and fairly adjudicated in State proceedings."3° 
The language itself hardly supports the Department of Justice as-
sertion that S. 2301 requires a reasonable state court determination of 
the federal constitutional issue. This was evident in an oral exchange 
between Senator Leahy and Mr. Trott. 
Mr. TROTT. I would think we could easily find a factual situation 
where ... the Federal court would be well-justified in saying we are not 
going to pay deference to the result of the State court's adjudication of 
these issues, because the determination was unreasonable in that it was 
flat wrong; it flew right in the face of Federal cases or precedent, or 
Federal rules, regulations or procedures. 
Senator LEAHY. But there is no "reasonableness" standard written 
in the bill, is there? 
Mr. TROTT. Well, the legislative history makes it very clear .... 
Senator LEAHY. Yes, but it is not in there. Wouldn't it be just sim-
pler to not write in anything that would even give the appearance of 
precluding a Federal court from determining Federal constitutional 
issues? 
Mr. TROTT. I do not think it gives that appearance at all, Senator 
31 
Compare Mr. Trott's interpretation of the language of the bill (as 
one of reasonableness) with Professor Amsterdam's interpretation: 
If passed, this provision would make the most drastic revision of the 
judicial system for enforcing constitutional rights that any Act of Con-
gress has made since Reconstruction .... 
. . . The scope of this prohibition embraces valid constitutional claims 
of every kind and consequence. No matter how fundamental the consti-
tutional right involved, no matter how plain the violation of that right, 
no matter how egregiously incorrect the state court's condoning of the 
violation, no matter whether or not the resulting conviction was sub-
jected to state appellate review, no matter how unfair the conviction or 
innocent the prisoner, he or she must remain unconstitutionally 
28. Habeas Corpus Reform: Hearings on S. 238 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 
99th Cong., 1st Sess. 58 (1985) [hereinafter Habeas Corpus Reform]. 
29. 428 U.S. at 494. 
30. See Habeas Corpus Reform, supra note 28, at 8. 
31. Id. at 17. 
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imprisoned. 32 
As Mr. Trott asserts, the legislative history supports the conclu-
sion that full and fair adjudication must meet a minimum standard of 
reasonableness. This is made explicit in the statement of Senator 
Thurmond, the bill's principal sponsor. 
A State adjudication would not be full and fair in the intended sense if 
the determination arrived at did not meet a minimum standard of rea-
sonableness. Specifically, the determination must reflect a reasonable in-
terpretation of Federal law, a reasonable view of the facts in light of the 
evidence presented to the State court, and a reasonable disposition in 
light of the facts found and the rule of law applied. 
. . . [D]eference to the State determination would be required only 
when, in the Federal courts' own estimation, such differences as they 
may have with the State courts reflect at most reasonable differences of 
opinion concerning the interpretation or application of Federal law, or 
pertinent factual conclusions, in cases in which the proper determination 
is unclear. 33 
The legislative history does not indicate why, if the objective is to 
preclude review only of reasonable applications of federal constitu-
tional law by state courts, the proposed statutory revision does not say 
that. Certainly if a sophisticated reader like Anthony Amsterdam in-
terprets the language as being at least as broad as the limiting language 
of Stone v. Powell, others are going to do so also. 34 
Whether a United States district court judge denying a writ of 
habeas corpus can find merely that the claim was "fully and fairly 
adjudicated in State proceedings" or whether it must be further found 
that the state court made a reasonable, if erroneous, interpretation of 
the relevant federal constitutional law, is unclear. 35 
That the Reagan administration desires to limit state prisoner ac-
cess to federal habeas corpus is clear enough. What is much less clear 
is what public policy objective the Thurmond Bill seeks to achieve. 
Although state court decisions would be deferred to, no deference is 
required when the state court application of federal constitutional law 
32. Id. at 151-52. 
33. S. REP. No. 226, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1983). 
34. The lower court decisions interpreting the Stone v. Powell limitation certainly do not 
suggest federal court involvement in unreasonably erroneous state court decisions. See 3 W. 
LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 5, § 27.3. 
35. The Department of Justice position sounds very much like the good-faith exception. The 
actions of both the constable and the state court will be sustained if their decisions, though 
erroneous, are reasonable. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984); see also The Omnibus 
Drug Enforcement, Education, and Control Act of 1986, H.R. 5484, which would permit the 
introduction of drug evidence obtained by a search and seizure if the officer, though mistaken, 
acted in good faith. 39 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 2463-64 (1986). 
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principles is less than reasonable. The judgment that a state supreme 
court's interpretation of the federal Constitution was not only errone-
ous but also unreasonably so, seems unlikely to resolve any ego 
problems a state court may have after being overruled by a single 
United States district court judge. 36 
Nor has the Department of Justice been consistent over the years 
with respect to the conceptual basis for limiting state prisoner access 
to federal habeas review. Illustrative of this, then-Assistant Attorney 
General, now Chief Justice, William Rehnquist in 1971 wrote to Chief 
Justice Warren Burger urging support for legislation that would have 
restricted the availability of federal habeas corpus. Three alternatives 
were proposed. The first would have limited habeas to constitutional 
violations "relating to the reliability of the fact-finding process under-
lying the judgment."37 The second would have required the petitioner 
to show "grounds for reasonable doubt of his guilt."38 The third 
would have precluded review if the petitioner "was given an adequate 
opportunity to obtain a hearing on his constitutional claim in the state 
court."39 Commenting on the third alternative, Rehnquist said: "A 
primary deficiency ... is that it would ... severely limit the rights of 
state prisoners to seek federal relief. "40 
In subsequent testimony before the Subcommittee on Constitu-
tional Rights of the Senate Judiciary Committee, Mr. Rehnquist said: 
It would be wrong to say that the writ, as used by Federal courts, has 
not on occasion served to vindicate the public interest in a fair trial. 
Unfortunately, however, it has been availed of time after time to reliti-
gate issues which not only have nothing to do with the guilt or innocence 
of the defendant, but nothing to do with the underlying fairness of the 
factfinding process by which he was found guilty.4 1 
36. See Olsen, supra note 3. 
37. See letter from William H. Rehnquist to J. Edward Lumbard 5 (Aug. 20, 1971) (sent to 
Chief Justice Burger with Rehnquist's letter of Sept. 23, 1971) (on file at Michigan Law Review). 
38. Id. at 8. 
39. Id. at 9. 
40. Id. at 11. Rehnquist did not assert that the proposal would preclude only "reasonable" 
applications of federal constitutional law by state courts. Rather he said, "Obviously, this would 
be the most severe of our three alternatives, since it would effectively divest a habeas right for 
state prisoners whose constitutional claims were determined in state court." Id. at 10. 
41. Speedy Trial: Hearings on S. 895 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the 
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 101 (1971). Mr. Rehnquist added: 
The compelling interest of the Federal system of criminal justice is not merely that the 
innocent be acquitted, but that the guilty be convicted only after a fact-finding process 
which is in itself fair to them. I think that all but a tiny fraction of the cases processed 
through the Federal and State criminal justice systems in this country meet that standard. 
But our concern for the rights of the criminal defendant requires that we leave open to him 
the right to Federal habeas corpus if he can show that he was denied such fairness. But 
existing practice by no means limits the writ to such use. 
Id. 
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The primary objective of the Department of Justice at that time 
seemed to be to limit state prisoner access to federal habeas to cases in 
which there was either reason to doubt the reliability of the fact-find-
ing process or reason to believe that the petitioner was probably 
innocent. 
This is apparently no longer the view of the Department of Justice, 
which now supports what Chief Justice Rehnquist described in 1971 
as the "most severe" limitation on state prisoner access to federal 
habeas. 
IV. COMPARING THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE/CONGRESSIONAL 
APPROACH TO CHANGE WITH THAT OF THE UNITED 
STATES SUPREME COURT 
Neither the Supreme Court nor the Department of Justice seems 
able to decide upon a single, consistent conceptual basis for limiting 
state prisoner access to federal habeas review. 
In brief, the Court seems to be trying to achieve at least three 
objectives: (1) greater deference to state courts, particularly with re-
spect to fourth amendment claims; (2) continued ability to use habeas 
corpus as an appropriate vehicle to make certain social engineering 
decisions, such as proper racial representation on juries; and (3) keep-
ing the door always open to those who can show that a federal consti-
tutional violation raises serious doubt about the reliability of the guilt-
finding process and can show, in the individual case, that the violation 
may have resulted in the conviction of an innocent person. 
In contrast, the Department of Justice and the 1986 congressional 
proposal for change seem designed to achieve the single objective of 
greater deference to state court determinations of federal constitu-
tional law questions. 42 But the requirement that state courts be rea-
sonable in their interpretations leaves unclear what significance, if any, 
would be given to questions of guilt or innocence or of fundamental 
unfairness. 
42. Deference to "reasonable" state court determinations would preclude the use of habeas to 
achieve social engineering objectives such as adequate racial representations on juries, see Batson 
v. Kentucky, 106 S. Ct. 1712 (1986), since reliance by the state court on prior United States 
Supreme Court precedent could hardly be viewed as unreasonable. It probably would also pre-
clude habeas in some cases in which the constitutional violation raises doubt about the reliability 
of the guilt-finding process and may have resulted in the conviction of an innocent person, so 
long as the alleged state court mistake as to federal constitutional law was a reasonable one. 
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V. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF CHANGE TO STATE PRISONERS AND 
STATE CORRECTIONAL PROGRAMS 
The literature dealing with federal court review of state court con-
victions contains relatively little discussion of the interests of state cor-
rectional programs or of the interests of state prisoners whose ability 
to pursue federal habeas corpus relief is at issue. What discussion 
there has been has dealt primarily with the public policy implications 
of change upon the general effectiveness of the criminal justice system, 
particularly the ability of the system to deter crime by the imposition 
of prompt and certain punishment for crimes that are committed. 
Assertions have been made that prisoner rehabilitation is adversely 
affected because prisoners are more concerned with litigation than 
with their rehabilitation. Yet the scant evidence43 and experience 
seem to lead to the conclusion that continuing access to justice serves, 
rather than disserves, the goal of prisoner rehabilitation, particularly 
for those who have an arguable claim of innocence. 
Perhaps the failure to give attention to the effect which change in 
the availability of federal habeas will have on state correctional pro-
grams and on state prisoners is because we know very little about the 
relationship between the two. But we do know more than has hereto-
fore been said, and we ought in any event to be asking the question if 
only to encourage others to seek the answers. First what we do know: 
(1) State prisons are full, and those responsible for the manage-
ment of state prisons have no desire to keep people who ought not be 
there at all or who ought to be there for a shorter period of time than 
their present conviction and sentence require: 
(2) The cases of greatest concern to prison inmates themselves 
are those in which it appears that the inmate did not commit the crime 
or does not deserve to be imprisoned for as long as the sentence re-
quires. These are also the situations of greatest concern to prison cus-
todial and treatment staff. 44 
43. See Schwartz, Retroactivity, Reliability, and Due Process: A Reply to Professor Mishkin, 
33 U. CHI. L. REV. 719, 744 (1966) ("[W]e currently know too little about .•• prisoner education 
•.• to warrant firm judgments that liberal habeas corpus impairs those objectives."). Professor 
Schwartz says Paul Freund 
has commented that filing habeas corpus petitions may actually have a positive therapeutic 
and educational effect on prisoners. Moreover, much of our crime is committed by the un· 
derprivileged and disadvantaged, those who find society cruel, unfair, and hypocritical. The 
concern for equal justice reflected in a system which does not forget such people but contin· 
ues to attempt to rectify any injustice they may have suffered can also have a significantly 
deterrent and educational effect. On the other hand, rehabilitation is seriously hindered if a 
prisoner feels he has been the victim of inequitable treatment. 
Id. at 744 n.130. 
44. In the University of Wisconsin Law School Legal Assistance to Institutionalized Persons 
Program we have had twenty years of experience in giving legal assistance to inmates of Wiscon· 
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(3) In contrast, little concern is expressed, by either correctional 
officials or inmates, over issues like the legality of the evidence used at 
trial, the composition of the grand jury, or other matters unrelated to 
guilt or innocence. Of course, most inmates welcome any possibility 
to get out of prison sooner, even if on what some may view as a techni-
cality. However, the inmate who believes in his or her innocence is 
different than one who admits guilt but believes a legal basis may exist 
for upsetting the conviction.45 
Although reliable data on the number of possibly innocent prison-
ers who are wrongly confined are lacking, the percentage of the total 
population is probably very small. One is reminded, however, of Jus-
tice Walter Schaefer's comment: "[I]t is not a needle we are looking 
for in these stacks of papers, but the rights of a human being. "46 
Though the number of completely innocent prisoners may be limited, 
experience demonstrates that a greater number of prisoners have a col-
orable argument that they are not guilty of as serious an offense or of 
as many offenses47 as their conviction record shows, or that their sen-
tence does not accurately reflect the actual sentence imposed or is ille-
gal in other respects. 48 Indeed, in Wisconsin in recent years as many 
as thirty percent of the convictions resulting in imprisonment had er-
rors which, if not corrected, would inappropriately lengthen the pris-
oner's period of confinement. In large measure this was because of a 
failure properly to credit preconviction jail time, but numerous other 
kinds of errors were also made. 49 
sin state correctional institutions. We frequently are asked by staff to see an inmate, often one 
who is agitated about his or her confinement. Typically the request is made because the staff has 
concluded that the inmate has an apparently legitimate reason for being agitated. For example, 
we were asked to see a 6'7", 290·pound, depressed, brain-damaged inmate who was given a six-
year prison term for what appeared to be a minor marijuana offense. Evidently the staff felt that 
the sentence was disproportionate to the conduct involved and felt that any correctional treat-
ment of the inmate would be seriously handicapped by the inmate's understandable feeling of 
injustice. A motion to reduce the sentence has been made. 
45. In my view, priority in legal services programs with limited resources should be given to 
the concerns of inmates who have some basis for believing that they are not guilty of the offense 
of which they were convicted or have received a sentence unduly long in light of the circum-
stances of the offense they committed. Our experience with correctional administrators at the 
institution and state levels is that they concur in the judgment that these cases deserve high 
priority in receiving legal assistance. 
46. Schaefer, Federalism and State Criminal Procedure, 70 HARV. L. REv. 1, 25 (1956). 
47. See Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 697-98 (1975) (Powell, J.) ("[T]he criminal law 
... is concerned not only with guilt or innocence in the abstract but also with the degree of 
criminal culpability."). 
48. Although federal habeas may not be available to redress many sentencing errors, due 
process requirements are applicable to sentencing, such as the right to be sentenced on the basis 
of accurate facts. See Note, How Unreliable Fact Finding Can Undermine Sentencing Guidelines, 
95 YALE L.J. 1258, 1281 & n.110 (1986). 
49. The original impetus in Wisconsin for granting credit for jail time was relief granted to 
prisoners who brought habeas in the federal district courts, successfully arguing that the denial of 
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At a time when the emphasis is increasingly on definite sentences 
proportional to the seriousness of the conduct, errors in sentencing 
have an impact on the inmate similar to an erroneous conviction for 
an offense more serious than that actually committed. Both result in a 
longer term of imprisonment than that legally justified. 
If inmates complain about their conviction, one cannot usually 
know with any degree of certainty whether the inmate is guilty or in-
nocent of the crime of which he or she was convicted. What one can 
do, however, is review the matter carefully to see if there is sufficient 
doubt about the reliability of the guilt-finding process to permit an 
arguably meritorious claim that an innocent person may have been 
convicted (or a guilty person convicted of an offense more serious than 
that committed). 50 
A postconviction process which is responsive to those who have an 
arguable claim of innocence (not guilty or at least not guilty of as seri-
ous an offense as that of which they were convicted) is desirable for 
several reasons: (1) imprisoning people who ought not be confined or 
ought not be confined for so long is economically wasteful;51 (2) a cor-
rectional program is unfairly burdened if it is asked to treat construc-
tively a person who has an arguable claim of innocence;52 and (3) a 
most basic right of an individual is not to be punished for a crime he or 
she did not commit. 53 It would seem to follow that from a state cor-
credit for time in jail while unable to post bail was a denial of equal protection. See United States 
v. Gaines, 436 F.2d 1069 (2d Cir.), vacated and remanded, 402 U.S. 1006 (1971) (in light of the 
equal protection concession of the Solicitor General). 
50. One might say, in behalf of inmates who claim innocence, that it is desirable to be able to 
argue that illegalities occurred that are unrelated to guilt or innocence, such as a fourth amend· 
ment violation. This seems to have been the position of Judge Friendly, who urged that any 
federal constitutional violation could be raised by federal habeas but only if the individual inmate 
could also make a colorable showing of innocence. Friendly, supra note 4. No doubt courts 
often find so-called technical violations if it appears that the inmate may be innocent. But there 
is merit to Paul Bator's claim that one can never know for sure about guilt or innocence and thus 
the best that one can do is ensure that the system is as effective as possible in separating the guilty 
from the innocent. This suggests that a proper balance of values may be to grant relief if inno-
cence is claimed and some reason exists to believe that the system may have been deficient in the 
guilt-finding process. In this respect postconviction counsel is to the criminal justice system what 
the pathologist is to the surgery department of the hospital. 
51. See R. POSNER, EcONOMlC ANALYSIS OF LAW 521 (3d ed. 1986); R. POSNER, THE 
FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 186-88 (1985); Posner, An Economic Theory of the 
Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1193 (1985). 
52. When I served on a parole board, the most difficult situation involved the inmate who 
said he did not commit the crime. If he did not, he obviously should be released. If he did 
commit it and is denying that fact, the denial might be indication of a high likelihood of repeti· 
tion and ought to be a factor against release on discretionary parole. In these situations it was 
comforting to know that the doors of the courts were open to deal with this issue. 
53. This is the conclusion reached by Jack A. Guttenberg in Federal Habeas Corpus, Consti· 
tutional Rights, and Procedural Forfeitures: The Delicate Balance, 12 HOFSTRA L. REV. 617 
(1984). He urges that procedural default not bar federal habeas review of guilt-related issues. 
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rectional program point of view the greatest opportunity for postcon-
viction review, both state and federal, should be for those who can 
make an arguably valid showing that the guilt-finding process failed in 
their case. 
Yet much of the discussion of requiring a "colorable showing of 
innocence"54 or of requiring a showing of doubt about the reliability of 
the guilt-finding process55 has been couched in negative terms - how 
to limit access to federal habeas corpus.56 Apparently, an affirmative 
argument has not been made that important state correctional objec-
tives will be served by allowing postconviction challenge by those who 
can make an arguable claim of innocence. Such an argument may be 
implicit in recent decisions of the Supreme Court that keep habeas 
available to the innocent even if they cannot show "cause" for failure 
to use proper state procedures, but the language of the opinions is of 
fairness rather than of a contribution to a proper and effective correc-
tional program. 
One consequence is that the current congressional debate is be-
tween those who, on the one hand, argue for continued access to fed-
eral habeas corpus for all claims of federal constitutional violation, 
whether or not related to guilt or innocence, and, on the other hand, 
those who argue for greater deference to state courts by denying access 
to federal habeas, even for those who are able to make an arguable 
claim of innocence. 
As is often the case, the extremes seem easier to defend than is a 
middle position. 
(1) To focus on guilt or innocence issues is arguably impractical, 
even if it makes good correctional sense to do so. 
It may not be so easy, as many critics of collateral attack think, to 
fashion rules limiting the use of habeas corpus to certain constitutional 
rights or to special classes of defendants. Consider, for example, a focus 
on the innocence of a defendant. Even a defendant who is guilty of 
something might have been innocent of the crime for which he was con-
victed. Degrees of culpability are often the important matters in dispute. 
Does a defendant who claims to have been improperly convicted of a 
higher offense get the same treatment as a defendant who claims to be 
totally innocent? And what does it mean to be innocent? That the Gov-
S4. Friendly, supra note 4, at 1S7. 
SS. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 2S0-7S (1973) (Powell, J., concurring). 
S6. See Cover & Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism: Habeas Corpus and the Court, 86 YALE 
L.J. 103S, 1099 (1977): 
There is now ample evidence that most of the Court recognizes guilt/innocence as an 
important constitutional value which informs the processes of articulation and enforcement 
of constitutional law related to criminal justice. But this evidence emerges primarily from 
opinions using the principle to narrow the scope of constitutional rights .... 
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ernment is unable to muster sufficient proofl Or that the defense has 
affirmative proof? 
It would not be surprising if, unable to agree on which claims deserve 
preference or which classes of defendants should receive special consid-
eration, reformers of habeas corpus attempt to provide for greater defer-
ence to findings made by state courts, to limit the repetition of petitions, 
and to devote most of their attention to procedural reforms, not to limi-
tations on the scope of the issues properly raised in habeas corpus 
proceedings. 57 
In addition to telling who is "innocent," knowing which constitutional 
violations give rise to doubt about the reliability of the fact-finding 
process is also difficult. The courts have struggled with this issue in 
determining whether new constitutional decisions are to be applied 
retroactively. For example, in one of the last decisions of the Term, 
the Court split on whether the prohibition against using peremptory 
challenges to exclude members of a race would adversely affect the 
reliability of the fact-finding process.58 
(2) Some argue that the number of state prisoners who are "ar-
guably innocent" is small, however "arguably innocent" is defined. 
Attorney General Meese has recently said that "writs of habeas corpus 
clog up the courts but add 'precious little to the quality of justice' "59 
(3) Some assert that state courts are as sensitive to the rights of 
the innocent as are federal courts and thus that federal habeas corpus 
is not needed as a protection to the arguably innocent. 60 
( 4) Finally, those who argue against any limitation on state pris-
oner access to federal habeas corpus seem to assume, without discus-
sion, that the interest of state prisoners would be disserved by limiting 
access to federal habeas to the arguably innocent. 
In my view, adopting the position of Justice Powell and eliminat-
ing the procedural obstacles now placed in the path of the state pris-
oner who seeks federal habeas are in the interest of state prisoners and 
state correctional programs. My reasons are: 
(1) As a limitation it is far preferable to the proposal in S. 2301 
that would limit access to federal habeas corpus to cases in which state 
courts failed to adjudicate the federal constitutional claim fully and 
57. Saltzburg, Habeas Corpus: The Supreme Court and the Congress, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 367, 
391 n.169 (1983). See also the thoughtful criticism of "the guilt-innocence based limitations" in 
Olsen, supra note 3, at 315-31. 
58. See Allen v. Hardy, 106 S. Ct. 2878 (1986); see also Olsen, supra note 3, at 322-31; cf. 
Guttenberg, supra note 53. 
59. Milwaukee Sentinel, supra note 1. 
60. See Nichols v. Gagnon, 710 F.2d 1267, 1271 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 940 
(1984) ("The concern ... assuring that the innocent are not convicted ..• cannot be faulted. But 
it is unclear to us why the state courts cannot be fully trusted to prevent such an outrage."). 
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fairly. However this limitation is interpreted, whether federal habeas 
would be available to the arguably innocent if the proposed legislation 
should be enacted is at best unclear. 
(2) As a limitation it is preferable to most of the increasingly 
complex and time-consuming procedural requirements adopted by the 
United States Supreme Court. Delay in reaching finality, which critics 
of present habeas practice seem to assume gives an undue advantage to 
the state prisoner, is not in the interest of the state prisoner who has an 
arguable claim of innocence. 61 Yet procedural requirements like that 
of Rose v. Lundy62 add to the delay in reaching what may be an argu-
able claim of innocence. 
(3) Federal court review by means of habeas does add signifi-
cantly to state court concern over guilt and innocence. 63 Although 
state courts are obviously concerned about the risk that an innocent 
person may be convicted, it is also true that federal court review of 
state court convictions has contributed significantly to the ability of 
state courts to make accurate guilt-innocence decisions. Several illus-
trations can be given: 
(a) In Sandstrom v. Montana, 64 the Supreme Court held uncon-
stitutional an instruction, commonly given in state courts, which could 
well have been understood by jurors to be a mandatory presumption of 
guilt. The salutary result has been the abandonment in state practice 
of this hard-to-defend instruction and, as important, an increasingly 
careful scrutiny by state courts of instructions whether phrased as in-
ferences or as presumptions. 
(b) In Beck v. Alabama, 65 the Supreme Court called attention to 
the risk to the innocent that may result from a failure to give a lesser-
included-offense instruction in a situation in which the evidence sup-
ports the giving of such an instruction. Again the impact on state 
practice has been a positive one. ·For example, in Wisconsin trial 
61. See Dean v. Young, 777 F.2d 1239, 1240 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1794 
(1986) ("Expeditious review of criminal convictions should be the norm. Review must come 
quickly in order to relieve those in prison of the continuing effects of a wrongful conviction. A 
day in jail cannot be reclaimed. . . . [D]elay is the enemy of truth."). 
62. 455 U.S. 509 (1982). 
63. It is interesting to note a conservative's view of the value of access to federal court for a 
civil plaintiff. "I think most trial lawyers .•. would be very loath to see federal diversity jurisdic-
tion taken away from the federal courts. There is a Jot of justice which has occurred as a result of 
that ability to go to the federal courts rather than the state courts .... " Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee Member Discusses Federal Courts' Role, Specific Legal Issues, THIRD BRANCH, Oct. 1986, 
at 1, 5-6 (remarks by Senator Orrin Hatch). 
64. 442 U.S. 510 (1979). 
65. 447 U.S. 625 (1980); see Note, Beck v. Alabama, The Right to a Lesser Included Offense 
Instruction in Capital Cases, 1981 WIS. L. REv. 560. 
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judges discuss this issue directly with the defendant in any case in 
which it appears that counsel has made a decision not to ask for an 
instruction on a lesser included offense. 66 
(c) Cases like Holloway v. Arkansas61 have contributed to state 
court sensitivity to the potential risk to a defendant if he or she is 
represented by the lawyer who is representing one or more codefen-
dants. Part of the problem in this situation is the possibility that such 
conflict as exists will result in less than adequate representation and, in 
turn, a risk that an innocent person will be convicted or be convicted 
of a more serious offense than that actually committed. 
(d) Other illustrations can be given. Certainly Jackson v. Vir-
ginia 68 underscores the importance of ensuring that the evidence is 
adequate to sustain a finding of guilty, and United States v. Gipson 69 
has called state courts' attention to the relationship between jury una-
nimity and proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Perhaps more obvious 
are the decisions such as Gideon, 10 insisting that defendants have a 
right to counsel, and Chambers v. Mississippi, 71 insisting that one has a 
federal constitutional right to introduce evidence in defense. 
Of course, the federal court can review guilt-related issues even if 
habeas corpus is unavailable as a remedy. The problem is that the 
time of the Supreme Court is limited and implementation of decisions 
such as those cited above may require, for a period of time at least, the 
oversight of the lower court federal judiciary. 
Federal habeas can also, as Justice Stevens urges, be available for 
both guilt- and non-guilt-related claims. The question, not easily an-
swered, is whether the opportunity to raise guilt-related issues will be 
increased if, as Justice Powell urges, federal habeas is limited to guilt-
related claims. Such evidence as exists seems to suggest that the oppor-
tunity to raise guilt-related claims will be greater if the views of Justice 
Powell prevail. Professor Y ackle suggests this possibility: 
Finally, if the Court were to import a new emphasis upon guilt or 
innocence into habeas corpus it would have to decide whether the effect 
would be only to restrict the availability of the writ by eliminating some 
claims from its scope, or whether its new analysis might lead it to extend 
habeas to some claims not previously entertained in collateral proceed-
66. See 3 Wis. JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CRIMINAL SM-6 (University of Wisconsin, Extension 
Law Dept. 1980). 
67. 435 U.S. 475 (1978). 
68. 443 U.S. 307 (1979). 
69. 553 F.2d 453 (5th Cir. 1977). 
70. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
71. 410 U.S. 284 (1973). 
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ings .... 72 
Some of the experience following the decision in Sandstrom v. 
Montana 73 is also instructive with respect to this issue.74 Because the 
Sandstrom decision was based on doubt about the reliability of the 
fact-finding process, it was certain to apply retroactively. Also be-
cause of the same doubt about the reliability of the fact-finding pro-
cess, it was arguable that the instruction could never be harmless 
error.75 Thus it appeared that any state prison inmate in whose trial 
the instruction was given was entitled to a reversal of the conviction, 
no matter how obvious the particular state prisoner's guilt might be. 
One would have thought, from a state prisoner point of view, that this 
was the happiest of all possible developments. In fact the reverse was 
true, at least in the State of Wisconsin. 
Several Wisconsin trial and intermediate appellate courts and the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin held 
a Wisconsin jury instruction to be unconstitutional under Sandstrom. 
When the issue reached the Wisconsin Supreme Court, that court ap-
peared to have the following alternatives: (1) reverse the conviction 
and thereby invalidate all previous first degree murder convictions in 
Wisconsin; (2) hold that a defendant cannot raise the issue if no objec-
tion to the instruction was made at the trial; 76 or (3) find that the 
Wisconsin instruction, unlike the Montana instruction in Sandstrom, 
did not create a sufficient risk of jury confusion and thus did not affect 
the reliability of the guilt-finding process. 
Holding that the failure to object to the instruction at trial consti-
72. L. YACKLE, supra note 3, § 101, at 399. In the historically important New York homi-
cide case People v. Caruso, 246 N.Y. 437, 440, 159 N.E. 390, 391 (1927), Judge Andrews said: 
"If guilt is clear, errors or instances of unfair conduct by the prosecutor may sometimes be 
ignored. The greater the doubt of guilt, however, the more likely are errors to affect the substan-
tial rights of the accused." See also the comment by Judge Posner in Nichols v. Gagnon, 710 
F.2d 1267, 1271 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 940 (1984): 
The proposition that "innocence is not irrelevant" was advanced in Friendly [supra note 4] 
in an effort to reduce the inundation of the federal courts with collateral attacks on convic-
tions, rather than to establish a new ground for such attacks. But it had, we conjecture, the 
unintended consequence of encouraging the Supreme Court to create in Jackson v. Virginia, 
443 U.S. 307, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979), a completely new office for the federal 
courts in habeas corpus .... 
73. 442 U.S. 510 (1979); see text at note 64 supra. 
74. We in the University of Wisconsin Law School Legal Assistance to Institutionalized Per-
sons Program represented some of the inmates, such as Mr. Pigee, in the Sandstrom litigation. 
This ought to be kept in mind in evaluating the significance of the analysis in this article of the 
experience with the Sandstrom decision. See Remington, supra note 3, at 300-04. 
75. In Connecticut v. Johnson, 460 U.S. 73 (1983), the Court split four to four on the issue of 
harmless error, but it later held in Rose v. Clark, 106 S. Ct. 3101 (1986), that the harmless-error 
rule did apply. 
76. See Hankerson v. North Carolina, 432 U.S. 233, 244 n.8 (1977) ("The States, if they 
wish, may be able to insulate past convictions by enforcing the normal and valid rule that failure 
to object to a jury instruction is a waiver of any claim of error."). 
588 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 85:570 
tuted a waiver would have been contrary to Wisconsin,s plain error 
rule.77 It therefore appeared that the courfs alternatives were to re-
verse all convictions or to find the instruction to be proper in all cases, 
even those in which the evidence of guilt was conflicting; thus, in the 
latter case, if the jury instruction were misunderstood there was a risk 
that an innocent person might be convicted. Despite the similar word-
ing of the Montana instruction ("[T]he law presumes that a person 
intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts.,,)78 and the 
Wisconsin instruction ("When there are no circumstances to prevent 
or rebut the presumption, the law presumes that a reasonable person 
intends all the natural, probable, and usual consequences of his delib-
erate acts.t,),79 the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that jurors would 
understand the Wisconsin instruction merely to place the burden of 
production rather than the burden of persuasion on the defendant;80 
thus, Sandstrom did not apply. 
Reviewing the same Wisconsin instruction in the Pigee case,81 the 
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held the instruction to be proper for 
several reasons, including that it had qualifying language not in the 
Montana instruction, and that the presumption could be overcome by 
"circumstances to prevent or rebut it.,,82 In a still later case the Sev-
enth Circuit said: 
[T]he Supreme Court's cases do not announce a firm principle that vindi-
cates the majority's decision in Pigee. Francis pulls the rug out from 
under the first reason the majority gave in Pigee,· the Court held uncon-
stitutional in Francis an instruction that informed the jury that "the pre-
sumption [of intent] may be rebutted." 
... The Wisconsin instruction may or may not receive the approba-
tion of the Supreme Court; certainly it presses if it does not exceed the 
wavering boundary staked out in the Court's cases. 83 
When the Wisconsin Supreme Court and the Seventh Circuit 
Court of Appeals were given what appeared to be two options - re-
verse the conviction of all prisoners convicted of first degree murder or 
find that the instruction did not raise sufficient doubt about the relia-
77. See 3 W. LAFAVE & J. lsRAEL, supra note 5, § 26.5(d). 
78. Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 513 (1979). 
79. Muller v. State, 94 Wis. 2d 450, 469, 289 N.W.2d 570, 580 (1980) (emphasis deleted). 
80. Muller, 94 Wis. 2d at 477-78, 289 N.W.2d at 583-84. 
81. Pigee v. Israel, 670 F.2d 690 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 959 U.S. 846 (1982). 
82. 670 F.2d at 694-95. 
83. Dean v. Young, 777 F.2d 1239, 1244 (7th Cir. 1985), cert denied, 106 S. Ct. 1794 (1986). 
The Wisconsin Court of Appeals subsequently sustained the instruction, concluding: "Shifting 
this burden of production to the defendant is constitutionally permissible, contrary to Rodri-
guez's assertion, so long as no reasonable juror could interpret the presumption as shifting the 
burden of persuasion." State v. Rodriguez, No. 85-2192 (Wis. Ct. App. Aug. 22, 1986) (LEXIS, 
States library, Wisc. file). 
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bility of the fact-finding process - the result, in my view, was predict-
able. I believe, but cannot prove, that the ability to limit relief to the 
arguably innocent would have led the Wisconsin court, and possibly 
the Seventh Circuit, to grant relief in a case in which the facts indi-
cated that the instruction, if misunderstood, may have led to the con-
viction of a person who was innocent of the crime charged (usually 
first degree murder). Thus limiting habeas relief to the arguably inno-
cent, in this situation, would have increased rather than decreased the 
chance of success for those who have an arguable claim of innocence. 
Later the United States Supreme Court held that a violation of 
Sandstrom can be harmless because, although the purpose of Sand-
strom "is to ensure that only the guilty are criminally punished," when 
"the verdict of guilty reached in a case in which Sandstrom error was 
committed is correct beyond a reasonable doubt, reversal of the con-
viction does nothing to promote the interest that the rule serves."84 
A frank recognition of this fact earlier in the process by all of the 
courts involved, state and federal, would have made significant contri-
butions to important correctional objectives: 
(1) In its original unqualified form, the Sandstrom decision gave 
rise to unrealistic expectations by a large number of Wisconsin in-
mates, expectations subsequently frustrated by the decisions of the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court and the Seventh Circuit. All correctional 
administrators agree that the worst thing for a prison population is to 
create expectations that cannot be fulfilled. 
(2) From a correctional point of view, elementary requirements 
of a constructive program for dealing with inmates are basic honesty 
and candor, especially when the answer is no. It is difficult to explain 
to a prisoner that the conviction was affirmed because it was con-
cluded that Wisconsin jurors clearly understood an instruction, if the 
various courts that reviewed the instruction were unable to agree on 
what it meant or on how it would be interpreted by the jury. Particu-
larly difficult is explaining this to a prisoner whose conviction was 
based on conflicting evidence, under circumstances in which jury mis-
understanding may have resulted in a conviction for an offense more 
serious than would have been found by a jury not misled by an admit-
tedly confusing instruction. 
Justice Stevens may be right that the public interest is served by an 
ability to deal with non-guilt-related constitutional violations by 
means of federal habeas. Certainly so-called social engineering objec-
tives, such as proper racial representation on juries, are important to a 
84. Rose v. Clark, 106 S. Ct. 3101, 3107 (1986). 
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proper system of criminal justice. It seems less clear that doing this 
will serve either the interest of a state correctional program or the 
interests of state prisoners. The issue is of fundamental importance: 
It is a habit that treats criminal defendants as not quite human - as 
symbols to be manipulated in a larger struggle rather than as people to 
be dealt with on their own terms. It matters little whether we use them 
to make an example of what happens to people who disobey society's 
norms or we use them to demonstrate our commitment to social justice. 
In the end, we are using them still, and use for one purpose breeds use 
for another. 
It is hardly surprising that we have fallen into this habit. Indeed, we 
may have had very little choice. An alternative model focusing on indi-
vidual defendants rather than broader social policy would require the 
state to make ultimate moral judgments about the persons charged with 
crimes. Instead of deciding what punishment served the commonweal, 
the state would have to determine what punishment the defendant de-
served. Such a model would, of course, require accurate factfinding. We 
would have to forsake use of the system to achieve goals that distort the 
reliability of individual results. 85 
VI. CONCLUSION 
It seems inevitable that limitations will be imposed on access to 
federal habeas by state prisoners. The need is for agreement on the 
conceptual basis for the limitations. Focusing on the possibility of in-
nocence seems clearly best from the point of view of the state prisoner 
and the state correctional program. It is better than the increased pro-
cedural obstacles which are inconsistent both with finality and with 
the obvious interest of the arguably innocent in a prompt decision. It 
is preferable to the proposal in S. 2301 because neither finality nor the 
status of state courts is served by the continued incarceration of those 
who are not guilty or not deserving of confinement for so long as 
prescribed. 
Correctional institutions work best when those who are confined 
have hope. 86 And correctional programs work best when the criminal 
justice system is understandable and credible. Judge Lay puts it best: 
"[W]ith knowledge of our fallibility and a realization of past errors, 
we can hardly insure our confidence by creating an irrevocable end to 
the guilt determining process."87 
85. Seidman, supra note 23, at 501-02. 
86. The worst prison in the country is the Atlanta Federal Penitentiary. See STAFF OF Sun-
COMM. ON COURTS, CIVIL LIBERTIES, AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE OF THE HOUSE 
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 99TH CONG., 2D SESS., REPORT ON THE ATLANTA FEDERAL PENI· 
TENTIARY (Comm. Print 1986). The report noted that "[t]his form of warehousing is brutal and 
dehumanizing. The Cuban detainees have no practical hope for release or return." Id. at iii. 
87. Lay, Modern Administrative Proposals for Federal Habeas Corpus: The Rights of Prison-
December 1986] Federal Habeas Corpus 591 
Although legislation was not adopted by the 99th Congress, efforts 
to change federal habeas corpus law continue in the lOOth Congress. 
State judges continue to express concern about federal habeas review 
of state court decisions, especially if that review is by a non-article III 
magistrate. Senator Thurmond has introduced another revision, as 
has Senator Sims. The Thurmond Bill88 is substantially the same as 
that introduced in the 99th Congress. Although it seems unlikely that 
any of the bills will pass, particularly with the Democratic majority in 
the Judiciary Subcommittee on the Constitution (Senator Paul Simon, 
Chair), the effort continues. It remains important therefore to con-
tinue the search for an acceptable basis in principle for defining the 
scope of federal court postconviction review of state court criminal 
convictions. 89 
ers Preserved, 21 DE PAULL. REV. 701, 710 (1972), quoted in 3 W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra 
note 5, § 27.2, at 299. But cf. Nichols v. Gagnon, 710 F.2d 1267, 1272 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. 
denied, 466 U.S. 940 (1984): "To transform the federal courts in the exercise of their habeas 
corpus jurisdiction from enforcers of specific constitutional rights to guarantors of the accuracy 
of state court determinations of guilt would enmesh the federal judiciary in almost every detail of 
state criminal procedure .... " To which it seems to me the response is: No, only those aspects 
of state criminal procedure that create an unacceptably high risk of convicting an innocent per-
son or a guilty person of an offense more serious than that committed. See Mishkin, The 
Supreme Court, 1964 Term - Foreword: The High Court, The Great Writ, and the Due Process 
of Time and Law, 79 HARV. L. REV. 56, 80 (1965): 
The principal grounds for habeas corpus generally accepted today on their face assert 
constitutional defects in the procedure used to convict; at base, however, the recognition of 
these grounds serves to free prisoners as to whom there is greater doubt than the Constitu-
tion allows that they have in fact done the acts which constitute the crime for which they are 
being punished. 
See also Hill, The Forfeiture of Constitutional Rights in Criminal Cases, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 
1050, 1075 (1978). 
88. S. 260, lOOth Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CONG. REc. S518-20 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 1987). 
89. My thanks to Mr. Paul Summit for his help in updating the congressional developments. 
